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Abstract
This paper examines the performances of the past ve Federal Reserve
chairmen using optimal control techniques and a macroeconometric model.
Each chairman is evaluated in two ways. The rst way is comparing the actual
performance of the economy under his term relative to what the performance
would have been had he behaved optimally. Comparing chairmen only on
the basis of the actual performance of the economy is not appropriate because
it does not control for different exogenous-variable values and shocks that
the Fed has no control over. This comparison is done for a wide range of
loss functions. It does not assume that the chairman necessarily behaved by
minimizing a loss function; it just compares his actual behavior to what he
could have done had he minimized a particular loss function. The second way,
on the other hand, assumes that each chairman minimized a loss function, and
it chooses for each chairman which of the various loss functions tried comes
closest to matching the actual values of the control variable to the optimal
values. A summary evaluation of each chairman is presented in Section 6.

1 Introduction
This paper examines the performances of the past ve Federal Reserve chairmen
using optimal control techniques and a macroeconometric model. A number of
Cowles Foundation and International Center for Finance, Yale University, New Haven, CT
06520-8281. Voice: 203-432-3715; Fax: 203-432-6167; e-mail: ray.fair@yale.edu; website:
fairmodel.econ.yale.edu.
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people have said that Alan Greenspan was the best Fed chairman ever,1 and the
methodology of this paper can be used to test this. Each chairman is evaluated
in two ways. The rst way is comparing the actual performance of the economy
under his term relative to what the performance would have been had he behaved
optimally. Comparing chairmen only on the basis of the actual performance of the
economy is not appropriate because it does not control for different exogenousvariable values and shocks that the Fed has no control over. This comparison is
done for a wide range of loss functions. It does not assume that the chairman
necessarily behaved by minimizing a loss function; it just compares his actual
behavior to what he could have done had he minimized a particular loss function.
The second way, on the other hand, assumes that each chairman minimized a loss
function, and it chooses for each chairman which of the various loss functions tried
comes closest to matching the actual values of the control variable to the optimal
values.
The methodology of this paper requires the existence of a model and the speci cation of a loss function. The model used is a version of the multicountry (MC)
macroeconometric model in Fair (2004). The loss functions are speci ed in terms
of ination and unemployment, with differing weights on the two. An overview of
the MC model is presented in Section 3, and some of its properties are discussed
in Section 4. The loss functions and optimal control procedure are discussed in
For example, Milton Friedman is quoted in Business Week, November 7, 2005, p. 42, as saying
It's clear that Greenspan has been the most effective chairman of the Fed since its inception.
Blinder and Reis (2005, p. 3) say of Greenspan While there are some negatives in the record,
when the score is toted up, we think he has a legitimate claim to being the greatest central banker
who ever lived. And Taylor (2005, p. 1) in his comments on the Blinder and Reis paper agrees
with this statement.
1
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Section 5, and the results are presented in Section 6.
The MC model is quite different from the macro model that is primarily used
in the current literature, namely the New Keynesian (NK) model. Arguments for
preferring the MC model over the NK model for monetary policy evaluation are
presented in Section 2 in Fair (2007), and this discussion will not be repeated here.
One of the main arguments for preferring the MC model is that it ts the data much
better. In Section 3 a few of the differences between the MC and NK models are
discussed, and in Section 6 some of the results in this paper using the MC model
are compared to results using the NK model and other smaller models. Given the
uncertainty that exists concerning the appropriate formulation of macroeconomic
models, it is useful to examine macroeconomic questions with more than one type
of model, which is another argument for using the MC model.
The way in which the Fed chairmen are compared in this paper does not appear
to have been done before. Romer and Romer (2004) discuss the past Fed chairmen,
but they present no measures of performance. Implicit in their discussion is the
view that Martin, Volcker, and Greenspan did well relative to Burns and Miller, but
no performance estimates are presented. Their view appears to be based mostly
on how the economy actually performed during each chairman's term and on
the chairman's embrace or non-embrace of modern economic ideas. In Romer
and Romer (2002) they argue that Martin did well, but again mostly using actual
economic outcomes. Blinder and Reis (2005, pp. 4548) argue that Greenspan
was lucky in probably having smaller shocks than previous Fed chairman had, but
this is not pursued further. They simply conclude that Greenspan was great in
addition to being lucky. Again, the measure of performance in this paper accounts
3

for the possible luckiness of each Fed chairman. Blanchard and Simon (2001) and
Stock and Watson (2003) document that the Greenspan period does appear to be a
time of smaller than historically average shocks.
There is also a related literature on estimating the parameters of the Fed's objective function along with the parameters of a model. Recent papers include Salemi
(1995, 2006), Favero and Rovelli (2003), Ozlale (2003), and Dennis (2006). These
papers deal with small linear models and a quadratic objective function, where
closed form expressions can be obtained. Salemi (1995) uses a ve-variable VAR
model; Favero and Rovelli (2003), Ozlale (2003), and Dennis (2006) use versions
of the two-equation Rudebusch-Svensson (1999) model; and Salemi (2006) uses a
version of the NK model. These papers do not compare Fed chairmen in the way
that is done in this paper, but some of their results are comparable to the results
here. This is discussed at the end of Section 6.
The idea of using optimal control techniques to measure economic performance
was presented in Fair (1978). This earlier paper compared different presidents
rather than Fed chairmen, under the assumption that presidents control the economy. In the present paper Fed chairmen are assumed to control the economy, which
seems a more realistic assumption. Computer speeds have increased enormously
since this earlier paper was written, and the optimal control procedure used in the
present paper improves upon the procedure used in this earlier paper, which was

4

Table 1
The Five Fed Chairmen

Period in Of ce
(Period Used: No. obs.)
William McChesney
Martin, Jr.
Arthur Burns
G. William Miller
Paul Volcker
Alan Greenspan

April 1951January 1970
(1954:11969:4: 64)
February 1970January 1978
(1970:11977:4: 32)
March 1978August 1979
(1978:11979:3: 7)
August 1979August 1987
(1979:41987:3: 32)
August 1987December 2005
(1987:42005:4: 73)

Mean Values

P ˙D

UR

RS

1.97 4.89 3.37
6.54 6.26 5.73
9.59 5.96 8.18
4.66 7.10 9.42
2.34 5.53 4.46

• P ˙D = percentage change (annual rate) in P D, the price

deator for domestic salesfrom NIPA accounts.
• U R = unemployment rate.
• RS = three-month Treasury bill rate.
fairly crude because of computer constraints.2

2 Background
Table 1 presents the ve Fed chairmen considered, their exact terms in of ce, the
quarterly sample periods chosen to represent the terms, and the average ination
One issue considered in this earlier paper not considered here is the state of the economy left
to one's successor. For example, Volcker left Greenspan a particular state of the economy. Had he
optimized, he would have left a different state. Greenspan's optimization problem thus depends
on what Volcker did. In evaluating Volcker, actual versus optimal, one should consider how he
affected Greenspan's period in addition to how he affected his own. Under the assumption that
Greenspan behaves optimally, one could compare how Greenspan could have done given the actual
state of the economy that Volcker left him versus how he could have done had Volcker behaved
optimally. This difference, which could be either positive or negative, would then be considered in
the evaluation of Volcker's overall performance. This issue is not pursued in the present paper.
2
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rate, unemployment rate, and interest rate during each term.3 Martin began his
term in April 1951, but because of data limitations, the rst quarter of his sample
period is taken to be 1954:1. Miller's sample period consists of just 7 quarters,
and so the results for Miller should be interpreted with considerable caution.
If one looks at just the historical averages of ination and the unemployment
rate, Martin does best, followed by Greenspan. Miller had very high ination.
Comparing Burns and Volcker, Volcker had higher unemployment but lower ination. Martin had the lowest average interest rate, and Volcker had by far the highest.
Looking just at these actual values, the view that Martin and Greenspan did well
relative to Burns and Miller is clearly supported. Since Volcker had the highest
average unemployment rate, he does not look particularly good. The purpose of
this paper is to see how this evaluation is affected when the degree of dif culty of
controlling the economy is taken into account.

3 An Overview of the MC Model4
The theoretical model upon which the MC model is based was rst presented in
Fair (1974a). An easier-to-read presentation is in Fair (1984). It has two of the four
features of what Goodfriend and King (1997) call the New Neoclassical Synthesis (NNS), upon which the NK model is based, namely intertemporal optimization
and imperfect competition. (The other two features of the NNS are rational expectations and costly price adjustment.) Households maximize expected future
Data sources and de nitions for all the variables used in this paper are listed in Fair (2004) and
on the website mentioned in the introductory footnote.
4
Some of the material in this section is in Section 2 in Fair (2007).
3
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utility and rms maximize expected future after-tax cash ow. The horizons for
the maximization problems are nite. The choice variables for a household are
consumption, leisure, and money holdings. The main choice variables for a rm
are its price, wage rate, production, and investment. Expectations of future values
by households and rms are based on current and past values. Expectations are not
assumed to be rational, contrary to the NNS. Disequilibrium is allowed for, and it
takes the form of rms telling households the maximum amount of labor they will
hire in the period and of actual sales differing from expected sales.
A household takes as given its initial values of money and bonds and the
current values of the price, wage rate, interest rate, personal income tax rate,
transfer payments, and the labor constraint from rms. It forms expectations of
the future values of these variables and solves it optimization problem given a
terminal condition on the value of its money plus bonds.
A rm faces a putty-clay technology. Adjustment costs are postulated for
changes in labor and the capital stock. Firms set prices and wages in a monopolistic
competitive setting. The demand for a rm's product depends on its price relative
to the prices of the other rms. A rm expects that other rms' prices are affected
by the price that it sets. In other words, a rm expects that other rms will raise
(lower) their prices if the rm raises (lowers) its own price. Similarly, the supply
of labor to a rm depends on its wage rate relative to the wage rates of the other
rms, and a rm expects that other rms' wage rates are affected by the wage rate
that it sets.5
No adjustment costs are postulated for price changes and wage rate changes, and all rms
can change their prices and wage rates each period. This is contrary to the NNS, where there
are adjustment costs to changing prices. The assumption of costly price adjustment is, of course,
5
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A rm takes as given all the initial values, including the initial values of other
rms' prices and wage rates and the current values of the interest rate and the
pro t tax rate. It forms expectations of the relevant future values, where again
its expectations of other rms' prices and wage rates depend on its own behavior,
and solves its optimization problem. It chooses its price, wage rate, amount of
each type of machine to purchase, and production. Given its price and wage rate
decisions, a rm has an expectation of its sales and of the amount of labor that will
be supplied to it. If actual sales turn out to be different from expected, this results
in an unexpected change in inventories. If actual labor supply exceeds expected
labor supply, the rm is assumed to hire only the expected amount. In fact, the
model is set up so that rms communicate to households the amount of labor they
are willing to hire (namely, the rms' expected amounts), and households optimize
under this constraint, as noted above.
Regarding the expectations of households and rms in the theoretical model, for
a number of variables equations are postulated specifying how the expectations are
formed. For the overall model in Fair (1974a) it is also speci ed that households and
rms estimate the parameters of these equations based on past data. In this sense
the expectations are sophisticated. The key point about expectations, however, is
that they are not speci ed to be rational or converge to being rational. Because
expectations are not rational, disequilibrium can occur, which drives many of the
properties of the model. Households and rms never learn the true model; they
grope around in a complex world, never quite understanding everything.
controversial, and it is not necessarily a desirable feature of the synthesis. Bils and Klenow (2004)
is a recent study casting doubt on the sticky price assumption.

8

Government scal policy decisions are exogenous. The government chooses
the two tax rates, transfer payments, the amount of goods to purchase, and the
amount of labor to hire. On the monetary policy side, an interest rate rule is
postulated in which the interest rate depends on ination and unemployment. Unemployment in the model is the difference between the labor that households would
supply if the labor constraint were not binding and the amount they actually supply
taking into account the labor constraint in their optimizing problem.
All ows of funds and balance sheet constraints are accounted for in the model.
One sector's saving is some other sector's dissaving. One sector's nancial liability
is some other sector's nancial asset.
The model in Fair (1974a) was a closed-economy model, but a two-country
model was introduced in Fair (1984). Again, all ows of funds and balance sheet
constraints among the sectors of the countries are accounted for. The choice of
a household now includes how much to purchase of the foreign good, which is
affected by the price of the foreign good relative to the price of the home good.
The exchange rate is determined by a reaction function of one of the country's
monetary authorities.
The model is solved by numerical techniques, given chosen parameter values
and initial conditions. In a model in which disequilibrium is possible, the order of
transactions matters, and the order chosen is 1) the government, 2) rms, and then
3) households. Transactions take place after households have optimized. Because
rms don't have complete knowledge of the model, their price and wage setting
behavior may result in sales differing from expected sales and labor demand differing from the unconstrained labor supply. There can thus be unintended inventory
9

investment and unemployment.
Regarding estimation, the theoretical work behind the MC model is used to
guide the speci cation of a model to be estimated (the MC model). Essentially,
the theoretical work is used to guide the choice of left hand side and right hand
side variables. The empirical equations that are speci ed are meant to be approximations to the decision equations of the households and rms. The left hand
side variables are the decision variables and the right hand side variables are those
that the agents take as given in the optimization process. Moving from theoretical work to empirical speci cations is a messy business, and extra theorizing is
usually involved in this process, especially regarding lags and assumptions about
unobserved variables.
Although the estimated decision equations are only approximations, they do
not suffer from the Lucas (1976) critique if expectations are not rational.6 More
speci cally, agents are assumed to form future expectations on the basis of past
values, where the parameters multiplying these values are constant. Expectations
are backward looking in this sense. The parameters in the expectation equations
are assumed not to depend on the parameters in the model: expectations not model
consistent (rational). In the speci cation of a decision equation to estimate, if
expected future values inuence the current decision (which is usually the case),
these values are substituted out by replacing them with the lagged values upon
which they are assumed to depend. The decision equation is then estimated with
these values included. If the parameters in the expectation equations are constant,
Evans and Ramey (2006) have shown that in some cases the Lucas critique is a problem even
if expectations are not rational. These cases are speci c to the Evans and Ramey framework, and
it is unclear how much they can be generalized.
6
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then this substitution does not introduce non constant parameters in the decision
equation. It is usually not the case that one can back out from the estimated decision
equation the parameters of the expectations equations, but there is usually no need
to do so. Under the above assumptions, expectations have been properly accounted
for in the decision equation.
This treatment of expectations does not mean that policy changes have no effect
on behavior. Say that the Fed announces a new policy regime, one in which it is
going to weight ination more than it has done in the past. If expectations are
rational, this announcement will immediately affect them and thus immediately
affect current decisions. Current decisions can be affected even before the Fed
has actually changed the interest rate. In the treatment here expectations and thus
decisions will be affected only after the interest rate has been changed. Decisions
respond to policy changes, but only in response to actual changes in the policy
variables. Announcements of new policy rules and the like have no effect on
decisions because agents don't know the model and thus don't use it to form
their expectations. If expectations were rational, the parameters would change
as regimes change, with the Lucas critique then being relevant. In the current
treatment the parameters of the estimated decision equations are constant across
policy regimes, although the decisions obviously change as the policy variables
change.
The equations of the MC model are estimated by two-stage least squares,7
The estimation periods begin in 1954 for the United States and as soon after 1960 as data permit
for the other countries. They generally end between 2004 and 2006. The estimation accounts for
possible serial correlation of the error terms. The variables used for rst stage regressors for a
country are the main predetermined variables in the model for the country.
7
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and the model has been heavily tested. The latest test results are presented in
Fair (2004), and these results will not be discussed here. In general the model
does well in the tests. The current version of the MC model consists of 328
estimated equations, with 1,502 coef cients estimated, plus 1,220 estimated trade
share equations. None of the coef cients are chosen by calibration. There are
59 countries in the model, where for 21 countries only trade share equations are
estimated. In the United States part of the model there are 31 estimated equations
and about 100 identities. Many of the identities are needed to account for all the
ows of funds and balance sheet constraints.8

4 Some Properties of the MC Model9
4.1

Interest Rate Channels

It will be useful to outline the various channels through which interest rates affect
output in the U.S. part of the MC model. Consider a decrease in the U.S. short term
interest rate, say a policy change by the Fed. This decreases long term interest rates
through estimated term structure equations. Interest rates appear as explanatory
variables in the consumption, residential investment, and nonresidential xed investment equations, all with negative coef cient estimates. In addition, decreases
in interest rates have a positive effect on the change in stock prices through an estimated capital gains and losses equation, which has a positive effect on household
The latest description of the MC model is in Fair (2004). The model can be analyzed on line or
downloaded from the website listed in the introductory footnote. The list of rst stage regressors
for each equation is also available from the website.
9
Some of the material in this section is in Sections 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3 in Fair (2007).
8
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wealth. This in turn has a positive effect on consumption because wealth appears
as an explanatory variable in the consumption equations. Also, a decrease in U.S.
interest rates (relative to other countries' interest rates) leads to a depreciation of
the U.S. dollar through estimated exchange rate equations.10 Other things being
equal, this depreciation is expansionary because U.S. exports rise and U.S. imports
fall. A decrease in interest rates thus has a positive effect on aggregate demand
through these channels.11
4.2

The U.S. Price Equation

It will also be useful to outline the main price equation in the U.S. part of the MC
model. In this equation the log of the price level (the private nonfarm price deator)
is regressed on a constant, the lagged logged price level, the log of the wage rate,
the log of the import price deator, the unemployment rate, and the time trend. The
coef cient estimates are presented in Table 2. The cost variables are the wage rate
and the import price deator, and the demand variable is the unemployment rate.
The time trend is added to pick up trend effects on the price level not captured by
the other variables. Adding the time trend to this equation is like adding a constant
term to an equation speci ed using the ination rate rather than the price level.
A relative interest rate variable appears in the exchange rate equations for Canada, Japan, the
United Kingdom, and Germany (Euroland after 1999). (All exchange rate equations are relative to
the U.S. dollar.)
11
There is one effect that works in the opposite direction. An decrease in interest rates decreases
household interest income, which has a negative effect on household expenditures through a disposable income variable in the household expenditure equations. This effect is, however, smaller
than the positive effects, and so the net effect of an interest rate decrease is positive.
10
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Table 2
U.S. Price Equation
LHS Variable is

RHS Variable
cnst
log P F−1
log W
log P IM
U R/100

time trend
SE

log P F

Coef.

t-stat.

-0.036
0.881
0.040
0.050
-0.177
0.00032
0.00343

-3.21
92.56
3.36
21.23
-7.40
9.88

• P F = private nonfarm price deator.
• W = nominal wage rate adjusted

for labor productivity.

• P IM = import price deator.
• U R = unemployment rate.
• Estimation period: 1954:12006:1.
• Estimation method: 2SLS.

This equation does well in various chi-squared testsreported in Table A10,
p. 206, in Fair (2004), with updated results on the website. No signi cant improvement in t occurs when 1) the logged price level lagged twice, the log of the wage
rate lagged once, the log of the import price deator lagged once, and the unemployment rate lagged once are added as explanatory variables, 2) the equation is
estimated under the assumption of fourth order serial correlation of the error term,
3) the log of the wage rate led once is added, 4) the log of the wage rate led four
times is added, 5) the log of the wage rate led eight times is added, and 6) an output
gap variable is added. When the output gap variable is added, the unemployment
rate retains its signi cance, and so it dominates the output gap as an explanatory
variable.
14

If the wage rate variable were dropped from the equation in Table 2 and the
equation were speci ed as an ination equation rather than a price-level equation,
the coef cient on log P F−1 would be one. In addition, if lagged ination were
added as an explanatory variable to the ination equation, this would introduce
log P F−2 with restrictions on the coef cients of both log P F−1 and log P F−2 .

These restrictions were tested in Fair (2000) and updated to other countries in
Chapter 4 in Fair (2004). They were rejected for the United States and generally
rejected for the other countries. They suggest that the price equation should be
speci ed in terms of price levels rather than ination rates or changes in ination
rates.
The wage equation in the U.S. part of the MC model has log W on the left hand
side and on the right hand side: the constant, log W−1 , log P F , log P F−1 , and the
time trend. The unemployment rate was also tried as an explanatory variable in
the wage equation, but it was not close to being signi cant. The price and wage
equations are identi ed because log P IM is excluded from the wage equation,
and log W−1 is excluded from the price equation. In the estimation of the wage
equation a long run restriction was imposed regarding the real wage, which is that
the derived real wage equation does not have on the right hand side the price level
separately or the wage rate separately. This restriction is not rejected by the data.
The price and wage equations were tested in Fair (2000) and (2004, Chapter 4)
against standard NAIRU equations, and they lead to considerably more accurate
price level and ination predictions. This is consistent with the rejection of the
NAIRU dynamics mentioned above.

15

A long run property of the price and wage equations is the following. If, say,
the unemployment rate is permanently decreased by one percentage point, the price
level is permanently higher, but the ination rate converges back to its initial value.
There is no permanent effect on the ination rate. The evidence in favor of this
property is the lack of rejection of the restrictions discussed above.
Regarding this long run property, it is obviously not sensible to think that
the unemployment rate can be driven to zero with no permanent effect on the
ination rate. The problem in my view with the speci cation in Table 2 (or with
speci cations in terms of ination rates or changes in ination rates) is the linearity
assumption regarding the effect of the unemployment rate or measures of the output
gap on the price level (or the ination rate or the change in the ination rate). At
low levels of the unemployment rate, this effect is likely to be nonlinear. I have
tried for both the United States and other countries to pick up nonlinear effects, but
there appear to be too few times in which the unemployment rate is very low (or
the output gap very small) to allow sensible estimates to be obtained. This does
not mean, however, that the true functional form is linear, only that the data are
insuf cient for estimating the true functional form. What this means regarding the
MC model is that one should not run experiments in which unemployment rates
or output gaps are driven to historically low levels. Price-level or ination-rate
equations are unlikely to be reliable in these cases.

16

4.3

The US(EX,PIM) Model

The optimal control procedure described in the next section is too costly in terms
of computer time to be able to be used for the entire MC model, and a subset of the
model, denoted the US(EX,PIM) model, has been used. This model is exactly
the same as the model for the United States in the overall MC model except for
the treatment of U.S. exports (EX ) and the U.S. price of imports (P IM ). These
two variables change when the short term interest rate (RS ) changesprimarily
because the value of the dollar changesand the effects of RS on EX and P IM
were approximated in the following way.
First, for given values of α1 and α2 , log EXt − α1 RSt was regressed on a
constant, t, log EXt−1 , log EXt−2 , log EXt−3 , and log EXt−4 , and log P IMt −
α2 RSt was regressed on a constant, t, log P IMt−1 , log P IMt−2 , log P IMt−3 ,

and log P IMt−4 . The estimation period was 1976:12006:1. Second, these two
equations were added to the US(EX,PIM) model, and an experiment was run in
which RS was exogenously decreased by one percentage point. This was done
many times for different values of α1 and α2 . The nal values of α1 and α2 chosen
were ones whose experimental results most closely matched the results for the
same experiment using the complete MC model. The nal values chosen were
-.0004 and -.0007, respectively.
The EX and P IM equations were not used for Martin because his period was
one of xed exchange rates. For Martin EX and P IM were simply taken to be
exogenous.

17

5 The Loss Functions and Optimal Control
Procedure
The loss in quarter t is assumed to depend on the deviation of the ination rate
(P ˙Dt ) from a target value of 1.5 percent12 and the deviation of the unemployment
rate (U Rt ) from a target value of 3.5 percent. More speci cally, the total loss for
quarter t is assumed to be:
Ht = λ1 (P ˙Dt − 1.5)2 + λ2 (U Rt − 3.5)2 + 1.0(RSt − RSt−1 )2
+1.0/(RSt − 0.499) + 1.0/(16.001 − RSt )

(1)

where λ1 is the weight on ination deviations and λ2 is the weight on unemployment
deviations. The last two terms in (1) insure that the optimal values of RS will be
between 0.5 and 16.0. The middle term penalizes changes in RS . The choice of
target values and weights is discussed in Section 6.
The optimal control procedure is as follows. Take the control period of interest
to be 1 through T . For example, for Martin 1 is 1954:1 and T is 1969:4. The
control variable is the three-month Treasury bill rate, RS .13 Consider computing
the optimal value of RS for quarter 1, RS1∗ . The loss function that is minimized
is assumed to be the expected value of the sum of the quarterly losses:
L1 = E1

k
∑

Ht

(2)

t=1

P D in the model is the price deator for domestic sales, and this is the price variable that the
Fed is assumed to care about. It differs from P F , the private nonfarm price deator, which is the
price variable explained in Table 2. P D, contrary to P F , includes import prices and excludes
export prices. It is close in concept to the consumer price index. The exact de nitions of P D and
P F are in Fair (2004) and on the website.
13
The actual control variable of the Fed is the federal funds rate, but this rate and RS are so highly
correlated that it makes little difference which is used.
12

18

where E1 denotes the expected value using information available at the time the
decision is made and where k is a large number discussed below. This is not a
linearquadratic control problem because the US(EX,PIM) model is nonlinear and
the loss function is not completely quadratic. Consequently, closed-form optimal
feedback equations cannot be derived. Only approximate solutions are available.
No discounting is done in equation (2). Whatever one thinks about whether
or not the Fed should discount the future, as a practical matter it is very hard to
get sensible estimates of discount factors. For example, none of the ve papers
mentioned in the Introduction that use the linear-quadratic setup estimate the discount factor. A value is simply imposed, ranging across studies from 0.975 to 1.0.
Dennis (2006) examines the sensitivity of his results to values between 0.95 and
1.0 and nds that the results are not sensitive to this range. In this paper a value is
also simply imposed, namely 1.0.
When solving this problem the Fed is assumed to know the US(EX,PIM) model,
the current and future values of the exogenous variables,14 and the error terms
(shocks) for quarter 1. The error terms for quarters 2 and beyond are set to zero,
their expected values. The assumption that the Fed knows the US(EX,PIM) model
may bias the results against the early Fed chairmen if the model that they actually
had at their disposal was less accurate than the model that later chairmen had. For
the results in this paper all the Fed chairmen are assumed to have the same knowledge about the economy, namely the US(EX,PIM) model. The main exogenous
variables in the US(EX,PIM) model are scal-policy variables, and so the assumpResults were also obtained relaxing this assumption that the current and future values of the
exogenous variables are known. This is discussed in Section 6.
14
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tion here is that the Fed knows future scal-policy plans. Since the Fed meets
more than once a quarter and since RS is the average value for the quarter, the
assumption that the Fed knows the shocks for quarter 1 is not unreasonable. The
Fed is essentially assumed to have a good idea of what is going on in the quarter
in which it is making its decisions.
Given these assumptions, the problem of minimizing L1 is converted into a
deterministic control problem, where the rst quarter errors are the actual historical
errors and the future errors are all zero. The problem is to choose values of RSt ,
t = 1, . . . , k , to minimize L1 subject to the US(EX,PIM) model. This problem

can be solved by the method in Fair (1974b), which sets up the problem as an
unconstrained nonlinear optimization problem and uses an optimization algorithm
like DFP to nd the optimum.
Although optimal values of RS are computed for quarters 1 through k , only
the value for quarter 1 is actually implemented. Consequently, k only needs to be
large enough to make RS1∗ , the optimal value for quarter 1, insensitive to larger
values of k . For the work in this paper k was taken to be 32 quarters. Making k
larger than this had a trivial effect on the computed optimal value of RS for the
rst quarter.
Once RS1∗ is computed, the problem switches to quarter 2. The model is solved
for quarter 1 using RS1∗ and the actual error terms for quarter 1 (which the Fed is
assumed to have known), and the problem that begins with quarter 2 runs off of
this base. Everything is the same except that t now runs from 2 through k + 1. In
particular, the Fed is now assumed to know the actual error terms for quarter 2.
Once RS2∗ is computed, the problem switches to quarter 3, and so on. Altogether T
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deterministic control problems are solved, resulting in RS1∗ , RS2∗ , . . . , RST∗ .15 The
economy that would have existed if these values had been chosen is obtained by
solving the model for quarters 1 through T using these values of RS and the actual
error terms. The endogenous variable values in this economy can then be compared
to the actual endogenous variable values. The endogenous variable values that are
obtained from the solution of the model using RS1∗ , RS2∗ , . . . , RST∗ and the actual
error terms will be called the optimal values. As just noted, behind these values
are the solutions of T deterministic control problems.
It will be useful to let Z denote the mean loss:
T2
∑
1
Ht
Z=
T2 − T1 + 1 t=T1

(3)

where T1 through T2 is the period of the particular Fed chairman of interest. Z is
computed in the next section for each Fed chairman's period for the actual values of
P ˙Dt and U Rt and the optimal values obtained from the solutions of the optimal

control problems.

6 Results
The Four Loss Functions

The results of any optimal control exercise obviously depend on the choice of
target values and weights in the loss function. The target value of 3.5 percent
for U R, the unemployment rate, is smaller than all values except three under
Remember that there are actually T · k optimal values computed, but only the rst value from
each deterministic control problem is used. For example, RS2∗ is the rst optimal value from the
solution of the control problem than begins in quarter 2 and ends in quarter k + 1.
15
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Martin, 1968:41969:2, where the value was 3.4 percent. The largest value of
U R in the 1954:12005:4 period is 10.68 percent in 1982:4 under Volcker. The

rate of ination, P ˙D, can be erratic on a quarterly basis. Looking at its fourquarter moving average, this average is smaller than 1.5 percent, the target value
for P ˙D, for 31 quarters under Martin, 1954:11955:2 and 1958:11964:1, and
13 quarters under Greenspan, 1994:2, 1997:21999:1, and 2001:42002:3. The
largest value of the four-quarter moving average is 12.03 percent in 1974:4 under
Burns. Because of the larger range of the ination values, the choice of a target
value for ination is more problematic than the choice for the unemployment rate.
Given the ination target of 1.5 percent and the quadratic speci cation, if, say,
ination is lowered from 8 percent to 7 percent, this has a much larger effect
on Z than if ination is lowered from 3 percent to 2 percent. Most people would
probably agree that lowering from 8 to 7 should be given more points that lowering
from 3 to 2, but it could be that the quadratic over does it and that different target
values should be used for different chairmen. The choice here, however, was to
use the same target value and examine the sensitivity of the results to different λ
weights.16
It should be noted that if one's economic model had the concept of a natural
rate of unemployment in it, then the model's estimate of the natural rate would
be an obvious value to use for the target unemployment rate. If the natural rate
changed over time, then the target would change. As noted at the end of Section
4.2, the present model has no concept of a natural rate. There is undoubtedly
some low value of the unemployment rate at which the relationship between the
16

Results were also obtained using an ination target of 2.5 percent. This is discussed in Section 6.

22

price level and the unemployment rate becomes severely nonlinear, but this value
cannot be estimated. If it could, this value (or perhaps a value slightly greater than
it) would be a candidate for the target value. Again, if this value changed over
time, the target would change. Since there is no evidence on this, the target value
of the unemployment rate was simply taken to be roughly the smallest value in the
sample period, namely 3.5 percent.
Four sets of values of λ1 and λ2 were tried, denoted Hawk, Owl, Dove,
and Dove+ . Hawk weights ination loss three times as much as unemployment
loss: λ1 = 3/2 and λ2 = 1/2; Owl weights ination loss twice as much as the
unemployment loss: λ1 = 4/3 and λ2 = 2/3, Dove weights the two equally: λ1 =
1 and λ2 = 1, and Dove+ weights ination loss half as much as unemployment

loss: λ1 = 2/3 and λ2 = 4/3.17
There are 208 quarters in the overall sample period, and so with four loss
functions tried, a total of 832 deterministic control problems were solved. With a
few exceptions, the length of the horizon for each problem was 32 quarters.18
The choice of a weight of 1.0 on the (RSt − RS1−1 )2 term in (1) with λ1 and
λ2 summing to 2.0 was made after some experimentation. The aim was to have the
It was not easy choosing a bird between a hawk and a dove. Switzerland is a neutral country
and I thought of using its national bird, but it has no national bird. Canada is another possibility,
but its national bird is the loon, which has other meanings that one would not want to attribute to
monetary policy makers. However, three of Canada's provinces, Alberta, Manitoba, and Quebec,
have the owl as their bird, and the owl is associated with wisdom, a characteristic that monetary
policy makers should have. So I chose the owl. My wife, Sharon Oster, who never seems to take
macroeconomics very seriously, suggested tit willow.
18
A forecast from the model between 2006:2 and 2009:4 was used to extend the sample period for
the experiments, and so for Greenspan the end of the horizon was never greater than 2009:4. For
Martin the end of the horizon was never greater than 1971:4. Having the horizon end after 1971 for
Martin, which is the beginning of high ination rates, led to erratic end-of-horizon effects, which
is the reason for this constraint.
17

23

standard deviation of the optimal values of RS be about the same as the standard
deviation of the actual values of RS . The use of the (RSt − RS1−1 )2 term leads
to interest rate smoothing. Without a term like this, the computed optimal values
can be quite erratic, much more erratic than what is ever found in practice. All ve
of the papers mentioned in the Introduction that use the linear-quadratic setup nd
signi cant interest rate smoothing.
The results that are presented in Table 3 can be used to examine both the question
of how well a non-optimizing chairman could have done had he minimized various
loss functions and the question of what loss function an optimizing chairman
approximately used. The variables listed in Table 3 per chairman and per loss
function are 1) the actual and optimal values of Z , 2) the average unemployment
¯ ,
rate, U¯R, 3) the average rate of ination, P¯˙D, 4) the average interest rate, RS

5) the standard deviation of the interest rate, SDRS , 6) and the root mean squared
error of the actual interest rate versus the optimal interest rate. The difference
between Z actual and Z optimal is a measure of how much better a chairman could
have done had he optimized. The root mean squared error is a measure of how
close his actual values of RS are to the optimal values.
Regarding Z , it is important to note that it is not what is minimized in the
optimal control calculations. Z is based on the solutions of T2 − T1 + 1 control
problems, not just on one problem that minimizes it. In fact, there is no guarantee
that the value of Z based on the actual values of ination and the unemployment
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Table 3: Actual and Optimal Values

Actual
Values

Optimal Values for Loss Function:
Hawk Owl Dove Dove+

Greenspan (1987:42005:4)

Z Act
Z Opt
Z Act − Z Opt
U¯R
P¯˙D
¯
RS
SDRS
RM SERS

−
−
−

5.53
2.34
4.46
2.00
−

6.60
6.02
0.58
5.61
2.14
5.98
2.15
4.30

7.06
6.79
0.27
5.56
2.26
4.71
2.28
1.62

Volcker (1979:41987:3)

Z Act
Z Opt
Z Act − Z Opt
U¯R
P¯˙D
¯
RS
SDRS
RM SERS

−
−
−

7.76
4.66
9.42
2.93
−

40.10
35.76
4.34
7.98
4.40
10.98
2.64
5.69

40.29
36.71
3.58
7.57
4.77
9.33
3.30
3.47

Miller (1978:11979:3)

Z Act
Z Opt
Z Act − Z Opt
U¯R
P¯˙D
¯
RS
SDRS
RM SERS

−
−
−

5.96
9.59
8.18
1.41
−

107.05
79.76
27.29
6.88
8.18
13.29
1.84
27.02

96.58
75.09
21.49
6.80
8.29
12.90
1.83
23.12

Burns (1970:11977:4)

Z Act
Z Opt
Z Act − Z Opt
U¯R
P¯˙D
¯
RS
SDRS
RM SERS

−
−
−

6.26
6.54
5.73
1.39
−

55.10
45.28
9.82
7.35
5.65
9.32
3.26
20.16

51.13
44.28
6.85
7.41
5.62
9.77
2.99
22.44

Martin (1954:11969:4)

Z Act
Z Opt
Z Act − Z Opt
U¯R
P¯˙D
¯
RS
SDRS
RM SERS

−
−
−

4.89
1.97
3.37
1.45
−

7.29
6.58
0.71
4.73
1.99
3.04
25
1.99
2.51

7.25
6.57
0.68
4.74
1.98
2.89
1.75
2.22

7.96
8.05
−0.09
5.51
2.34
4.00
2.23
1.69

8.86
9.09
−0.23
5.47
2.37
4.16
2.43
2.18

40.68
37.60
3.08
6.99
5.24
6.23
3.54
13.66

41.06
38.87
2.19
6.76
5.40
4.74
3.52
27.48

75.65
68.21
7.44
6.36
8.97
10.37
1.47
5.27

54.72
57.08
−2.36
5.81
9.85
7.16
1.10
1.53

43.18
41.21
1.97
7.03
5.90
8.12
2.72
10.88

35.23
35.39
−0.16
5.86
6.93
4.81
2.19
3.49

7.16
6.44
0.72
4.74
1.99
2.63
1.38
2.38

7.08
6.17
0.91
4.72
1.99
2.42
1.21
3.02

Notes to Table 3

• See notes to Table 1.
• Z Act = Actual value of Z .
• Z Opt = Optimal value of Z .
• U¯R = mean of U R.
• P¯˙D = mean of P ˙D.
¯ = mean of RS .
• RS
• SDRS = standard deviation of RS .
• RM SERS = root mean squared error, actual RS versus optimal RS .
• Hawk: λ1 = 3/2 and λ2 = 1/2 in equation (1).
• Owl: λ1 = 4/3 and λ2 = 2/3 in equation (1).
• Dove: λ1 = 1 and λ2 = 1 in equation (1).
• Dove+ : λ1 = 2/3 and λ2 = 4/3 in equation (1).

rate will be greater than the value of Z based on the predicted values of ination
and the unemployment rate using the computed optimal values of RS . Z is just
meant to be a summary measure.
Greenspan

Table 3 shows that had Greenspan minimized loss function Hawk (using the procedure in this paper), he would have lowered the average loss that he actually obtained
by 0.58 points (from 6.60 to 6.02). The average unemployment rate would have
been 5.61 percent rather than 5.53 percent, the average ination rate would have
been 2.14 percent rather than 2.34 percent, and the average interest rate (the control
variable) would have been 5.98 percent rather than 4.46 percent. For loss function
Owl the potential gain is 0.27 points, and for loss functions Dove and Dove+ the
potential gain is negative (−0.09 and −0.23 points respectively). A negative potential gain means that Greenspan's actual behavior was better in terms of leading
to a lower value of loss than what would have been achieved had the particular loss
function been minimized using the procedure in this paper. Greenspan thus looks
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very good for Dove and Dove+ and fairly good for Owl. Hawk is a little worse.
The root mean squared error is smallest for Owl and almost as small for Dove,
and so under the assumption that Greenspan minimized a loss function, the loss
function is approximately Owl or Dove. Greenspan is least close to minimizing
loss function Hawk, since it has the highest root mean squared error.
Volcker

The gain that Volcker could have achieved by optimizing is also highest for Hawk
and lowest for Dove+ , but even for Dove+ the gain is positive (2.19 points). Regardless of the loss function, the results say that Volcker could have done better.
Table 4 present the values by quarter for Volcker for loss function Owl. The table
shows that Volcker allowed fairly large changes in the interest rate in the rst three
years of his term (primarily because he was trying to target the money supply in this
period). The optimal control results in Table 3 are essentially saying that regardless
of the loss function, Volcker should have smoothed more in his rst three years.
The root mean squared error is smallest for Owl, and so if Volcker minimized a
loss function, the loss function is closest to Owl.
Burns

The results for Miller are based on only 7 observations, and so Miller will be
skipped for now. The Burns results are quite clear. The potential gain is large for
Hawk and Owl, moderate for Dove, and negative but close to zero for Dove+ . The
root mean squared error is by far the smallest for Dove+ . So if Burns minimized
a loss function, the loss function was closest to Dove+ . If he did not, his actual
27

Table 4
Volcker Results for Loss Function Owl

∗

Quarter

RS ∗

RS a

U R∗

U Ra

P ˙D

1979.4
1980.1
1980.2
1980.3
1980.4
1981.1
1981.2
1981.3
1981.4
1982.1
1982.2
1982.3
1982.4
1983.1
1983.2
1983.3
1983.4
1984.1
1984.2
1984.3
1984.4
1985.1
1985.2
1985.3
1985.4
1986.1
1986.2
1986.3
1986.4
1987.1
1987.2
1987.3

13.41
15.20
14.70
14.88
14.95
14.73
14.14
12.76
11.06
9.41
8.31
6.96
6.72
6.97
7.89
8.59
9.35
10.03
10.09
9.50
9.00
8.01
7.14
6.26
6.63
6.95
6.10
5.46
5.03
5.42
6.20
6.74

11.80
13.46
10.05
9.24
13.71
14.37
14.83
15.09
12.02
12.89
12.36
9.71
7.93
8.08
8.42
9.19
8.79
9.13
9.84
10.34
8.97
8.18
7.52
7.10
7.15
6.89
6.13
5.53
5.34
5.53
5.73
6.03

5.96
6.38
7.54
8.14
8.13
8.37
8.44
8.40
9.05
9.40
9.65
9.77
10.12
9.53
9.01
8.14
7.29
6.68
6.40
6.54
6.50
6.61
6.74
6.75
6.64
6.64
6.88
6.77
6.70
6.56
6.29
6.11

5.94
6.30
7.32
7.68
7.40
7.43
7.40
7.42
8.24
8.84
9.43
9.94
10.68
10.40
10.10
9.36
8.54
7.87
7.48
7.45
7.28
7.28
7.29
7.21
7.05
7.02
7.18
6.99
6.84
6.62
6.28
6.01

9.69
11.48
5.95
8.30
9.10
8.29
6.30
7.88
6.20
5.82
3.90
5.35
4.20
2.34
3.56
6.30
4.23
4.73
5.07
3.28
2.74
4.07
2.69
2.45
2.87
2.06
0.32
3.30
2.20
1.80
2.81
3.49

P ˙D

a

9.81
11.79
6.62
9.35
10.30
9.47
7.15
8.29
6.51
5.63
3.26
4.37
3.13
1.14
2.24
4.98
3.14
3.85
4.38
2.76
2.37
3.86
2.49
2.33
2.77
2.03
0.40
3.43
2.36
2.02
3.12
3.89

• See notes to Table 1.
• a = actual value, ∗ = optimal value.

behavior is poor for loss functions Hawk and Owl, medium for Dove, and good
for Dove+ . The negative potential gain for loss function Dove+ says that Burns'
actual behavior was slightly better in terms of leading to a lower value of loss
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function Dove+ than what would have been achieved had loss function Dove+
been minimized using the procedure in this paper.
Martin

The potential gains for Martin do not vary much across the four loss functions,
and, like for Volcker, the results say that Martin could have done better for all the
loss functions. The root mean squared error is smallest for Owl, but the values for
Hawk and Dove are close to that for Owl. Martin did not have an ination problem
between 1958 and 1963 in the sense that P ˙D was below its target value of 1.5
percent during almost all of this period, and the optimal control results say that
he should have lowered the unemployment rate more in this period. The average
value of the actual interest rate in Table 3 for Martin is larger than that average
value of the optimal interest rate even for loss function Hawk.
Miller

For what it is worth, given the small number of observations, the story for Miller
is very similar to the story for Burns.
Comparisons Across Chairmen

So, was Greenspan the best of the ve chairmen? The above discussion of the
individual chairmen shows that this is a complicated question. The evaluation of
Burns and Miller clearly depends on the loss function. For loss function Dove+
both do ne, but otherwise not. The reason than Burns and Miller are generally
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judged unfavorably is probably because most people have loss functions that are
much more hawkish than Dove+ . In other words, loss function Dove+ probably
weights ination loss relative to unemployment loss much too little for most people.
And for loss function Owl, for example, Burns and Miller could have done much
better.
The story is different for Volcker and Martin. The results say that both could
have done better for any of the loss functions. Volcker could have smoothed more
early in his term, and Martin could have lowered the unemployment rate during
some of his term when ination was not a problem.
Greenspan looks good across the four loss functions. The largest potential gain
is for loss function Hawk, but even here the potential gain is small relative to the
potential gains for the other chairmen. One could thus conclude that Greenspan
is the best for loss functions Hawk, Owl, and Dove. For loss function Dove+
Greenspan, Miller, and Burns are essentially tied.
Robustness of the Results

The results are not sensitive to the assumption that the exogenous variable values
are known. A second set of results was obtained using a version of the model in
which a fth-order autoregressive equation with a constant term and time trend
was estimated for each exogenous variable except dummy variables, and these
equations were added to the model. A total of 88 equations were added. This is a
version of the model in which there are no exogenous variables except for a few
dummy variables. The same optimal control procedure was applied to this version
as was applied to the basic version. None of the above comparisons were changed
30

using this version. The story for each chairman is the same.
Another set of results was obtained using 2.5 percent as the target value for
ination rather than 1.5 percent. This choice is somewhat problematic because the
actual ination rate is lower than 2.5 percent for many quarters, which implies,
other things being equal, that the Fed in many cases should stimulate the economy
to get the ination rate back up. This choice also means that each loss function is
less hawkish than it was before. The stories are also similar for this set of results,
although Greenspan, Miller, and Burns look slightly better because of the less
Hawkish loss functions. It is still the case that Volcker and Martin could have done
better for all loss functions.
Comparison to Other Results

The primary concern of the ve papers mentioned in the Introduction, Salemi
(1995, 2006), Favero and Rovelli (2003), Ozlale (2003), and Dennis (2006), is
to estimate the parameters of the objective function of the Fed along with the
parameters of the model. This concern is related to the second way of evaluating
Fed chairmen in this paper, namely choosing for each chairman which of the various
loss functions tried comes closest to matching the actual values of the interest rate
to the optimal values. In the present case, however, the problem cannot be set up as
a linear-quadratic problem because the model is nonlinear, and so the estimation
approach of these papers cannot be followed. The model is instead estimated
separately (by 2SLS), and the λ weights are simply chosen to minimize the root
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mean squared error of the actual interest rate values versus the optimal values.19 In
spite of these differences, there is a common result. All ve papers nd that the Fed
weighted ination more relative to output in the Volcker-Greenspan period than
before.20 This is consistent with the result in this paper that objective function Owl
is closest for Volcker and Greenspan and that objective function Dove+ is closest for
Miller and Burns. However, for the period prior to 1970:1, the objective function
is back to Owl (for Martin).
With one exception these studies do not address the rst way of evaluating
Fed chairmen in this paper, which is to compare actual to optimal behavior. They
simply assume that the Fed optimized. The exception is Salemi (2006), who
estimates the parameters of a policy rule rather than the parameters of the objective
function. This allows him to compare the parameter estimates with and without
the assumption that the Fed optimizes. He nds that the Fed could have lowered
loss by 3.1 percent in the period 1965:11980:4 and by 0.5 percent in the period
1980:12001:4. This difference is roughly consistent with the results for, say, loss
function Owl in Table 3, where Z Act − Z Opt is smaller for Greenspan and Volcker
than for Miller and Burns. This is not true, however, for a loss function like Dove+ .
The models are also, of course, quite different from the US(EX,PIM) model. Salemi (1995) uses
a ve-variable VAR model. The Rudebusch-Svensson (1999) model, used by Favero and Rovelli
(2003), Ozlale (2003), and Dennis (2006), is a (backward-looking) two-equation model where the
output gap depends on lagged output gaps and the lagged real interest rate and the ination rate
depends on lagged ination rates and the lagged output gap. Salemi (2006) uses a (forward-looking)
two-equation NK model where the output gap depends on lagged output gaps, the expected future
output gap, and the real interest rate and the ination rate depends on the lagged ination rate, the
expected future ination rate, and the output gap.
20
Actually, Dennis (2006) never found the output gap to be signi cant in the Fed's objective
function, but he did nd the ination target to be smaller in the Volcker-Greenspan period than
before, namely 1.4 percent versus 7.0 percent before.
19
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7 Conclusion
The results are summarized at the end of the previous section, and this will not
be repeated here. The conventional wisdom that Miller and Burns did not do well
is supported by the results unless one is very dovish. Volcker and Martin could
have done better across all loss functions, and Greenspan did well across all loss
functions. Under the assumption that each chairman minimized a loss function, the
loss function that comes closest to matching this behavior is Owl for Greenspan,
Volcker, and Martin, and Dove+ for Miller and Burns.
Since the assumption that the Fed chairmen optimized is a strong one and since
the rst way of evaluating Fed chairmen in this paper does not require this assumption, most of the weight should probably be placed on this set of comparisons,
namely the Z Act − Z Opt values in Table 3. These comparisons are based on the
assumption that each Fed chairman could have had the US(EX,PIM) model available for use and could have minimized a loss function in the manner discussed in
Section 5. The main requirement for minimizing the loss function is that the error
terms for the current quarter are known. As discussed above, the results are not
sensitive to the assumption that the current and future exogenous variable values
are known. It is an open question on how robust the present conclusions are to the
use of different models and informational assumptions.
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